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For Romania, as for all other ex-communist countries from Eastern Eu-
rope, the transition from the rigid centrally planned economic system
to the free-market economy, fair competition based, was an amazing
experience. From the academic standpoint, the economic reform was a
huge research opportunity, as well as having extremely important prac-
tical consequences. Based on the case of Romania, the authors have
developed an original, bi-dimensional matrix model of this transition
process (Scarlat Model), emphasizing the typology of four basic eco-
nomic systems. Managerial aspects are underlined – both for economic
systems and transition process – as well as some stability considera-
tions. Two features of the transition strategy are presented: the tran-
sition path and duration of the process. Special attention was paid to
assessing the moment by when the economic transition ends. Analy-
sis of the transition path – based on the theory of deterministic chaos
(i. e. short-run predictability) – has led to interesting results: a compre-
hensive research on the evolution of the Romanian currency exchange
over a period of sixteen years (1990–2005) revealed three intervals in
the Romanian recent history of economic transition and confirmed the
diagnostic of transition end. The general model is applied in the case of
Romania and some interesting findings are presented, but it is also fully
applicable to all Eastern European countries and not only Romania.
The eu accessing process is a diﬀerent type of transition – rigorously
planned, regulated and monitored.
Key Words: economy model, economic transition, transition path,
deterministic chaos, eu accession
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Introduction
In 1989, the seemingly solid system of centrally planned economy col-
lapsed. The revolutionary changes that started in Poland demolished the
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whole Soviet-style command economic system of Eastern Europe and
the Soviet Union itself. Dramatic changes in the economic systems of
these countries followed, but the scientists were not prepared for such a
moment: there was no valid theory of economic reform to rely on – as
there was no such precedent. Within the empty space of the economic
theory in this respect, the fall of communism has given way to a variety
of strange, archaic, alternate and even ‘informal’ and ‘parallel’ forms of
management and enterprise – as the entrepreneurial energy existed but
it was not properly channelled (Dana and Dana 2003).
As Aligica describes (2006), the raise of the new institutionalism is one
of the most significant reactions of the economic reform experience.
A comprehensive World Bank report (World Bank 2004) evaluates the
World Bank assistance in 26 countries in Europe and Central Asia. Af-
ter 1989, the transition countries ‘have undertaken massive reforms of
their economic systems, transforming institutions, processes, attitudes,
and fundamental concepts of individual and organisational behaviour’.
Considering its complexity, the development of an ‘easy-to-understand’
but working model of economic transition is a considerable challenge.
The economic reforms have had significant impact in all sectors and
important research eﬀorts have been made to clarify, explain or solve
problems related to the transition processes. Even gender issues were
such a subject (Homlong and Springler 2006) – in order to identify the
quality and quantity of female labour participation in such processes.
Based on the authors’ experience and research during more than fif-
teen years of transition from a centrally planned economy toward a free-
market economic system, an original model of the economic systems and
transition was developed.
More or less authorised voices speak knowingly about ‘privatisation’,
‘economic reform’ or ‘transition toward market economy’ and – more
recently – the European Union. In spite of their actuality, they often gen-
erate questions and are even confusing.
The proposed model allows for clear definitions, and possible transi-
tion strategies are analyzed. The role of government is emphasized, as
well as the key-role of the public administration in the process of acces-
sion to the European Union.
The economic and transition model, which is proposed by the au-
thors as a conceptual framework, is bi-dimensional. Types of ownership
(state/private) and management (centralized/decentralized) are consid-
ered. Consequently, the resulting ‘two by two matrix’ reveals four types
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of economic systems – among them the centrally-planned economy and
the free-market economic system. The major advantage of this model is
its analytical potential. The diﬀerent transition strategies are presented
and the position of a certain economic system, on its path toward the
free-market economy, at a certain moment, can be easily identified. The
topic of this paper is very actual, extremely important and relevant to the
current state of knowledge for – at least – two reasons:
• The proposed transitionmodel is both theoretical and practical (ex-
planatory) as well as being an investigation tool (Ardelea and Scarlat
1991; Scarlat 1994; 1999; 2001; 2003a; Scarlat and Curaj 2004).
• The research conducted in Romania, the analysis of time series of
certain macroeconomic indicators (such as the exchange rate) dur-
ing the transition period or the transition path, from the standpoint
of deterministic chaos (i. e. short-term predictability), has revealed
interesting characteristics (Scarlat 2005; Scarlat, Stan, and Cristescu
2007a; 2007b) and was in accordance with the other estimations
about the end of transition.
Some of the conclusions of the research might be applicable to other tran-
sition economies as important decision support tools.
EconomyModel
Using a political economy approach, and based on diﬀerent criteria (po-
litical structures, ‘What is a good society?’ and the pace of implementing
the transition policies), Marangos (2005; 2006) has identified and devel-
oped five alternative models of transition: Shock Therapy, the Neoclas-
sical Gradualist model, the Post-Keynesian model of transition, the Plu-
ralistic Market Socialist, and the Non-Pluralistic Market Socialist model
of transition (the Chinese model). These models are associated with al-
ternative institutional development processes – i. e. the decision depends
on what institutions are considered to bemore eﬃcient: institutions pro-
duced by state intervention ormarket-generated. The neoclassical gradu-
alist model maximizes the social welfare under the given internal and ex-
ternal constraints (Marangos 2006). Unfortunately, this meritorious and
complex typology presents definition elements of both economic transi-
tion (as shock therapy) and economic system (others), which might be
confusing.
Definitely, an economic system is described by a certain number of
features: more features, more information and – finally – the system is
Volume 5 · Number 4 · Winter 2007
310 Cezar Scarlat and Eugen I. Scarlat
better described. The issue is to investigate the possibility of character-
ising (any) economic system by a minimum number of parameters, in
order to simplify the analysis as much as possible (but they still describe
the system completely). The point is to find the most important features.
The basic assumption is that any economic system can be characterised
by two major features, considered as determining features:
• The type of ownership that could be, basically, state ownership
or private ownership (the intermediate or mixed ownership is ac-
cepted).
• The type of management adopted by businesses/organisations ac-
tive within the economic system.
We agree to define the management type as centralised if all the vital
decisions are made at the macroeconomic level (government), and the
decentralised management, where decisions are made at the microeco-
nomic (organisation) level (intermediate forms of management are also
accepted).
The result of these assumptions is the two-dimension (matrix) model
presented in figure 1. Validity of the model’s assumptions is proved by the
fact that all the important types of economic systems are described fairly
completely. While the association ‘private ownership’ & ‘decentralised
management’ is typical of the democratic countries’ ‘market economy’
(quarter i), the association ‘state ownership’ & ‘centralised management’
defines ‘the command economy’ or centrally planned economy of the
communist/socialist countries (quarter iii). Analysing the model with
combinatorial techniques, two more associations are shown: ‘private
ownership’ & ‘centralised management’ (quarter ii), defining the econ-
omy of monopoly and ‘state ownership’ & ‘decentralised management’
(quarter iv), introducing the so-called ‘social-market’ economy.
It is important to avoid the confusion between ‘centrally planned
economy’ and ‘planned business activity’ – core of the modern free-
market economy. Unfortunately, such confusions were frequently pre-
sented in Romanian newspapers and mass media, right after 1990. An-
other trap to be avoided: the modern free-market economy is not the
old ‘market’ economy dominated by powerful monopolies (economy of
monopoly).
The free-market economic system is superior to the centrally planned
economy for two reasons, at least:motivation (as a result of private own-
ership) and flexibility (as a result of decentralized management).
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figure 1 The matrix model of four basic types of economic systems
stability and management considerations
From the management standpoint, the description of the proposed
model (Scarlat’s Model) starts from two basic prerequisites:
• private ownership, opposed to the public one, generates motivation;
• decentralisation, determines the flexibility of management systems
and processes.
On the other hand, the basic management principle states that the
owner makes the decisions (regardless of who are the owners – individu-
als, businesses or the government). This situation is met in quarters i and
iii, which corresponds to relatively stable systems. Any other situation
means conflicts or potential conflicts between the owner and decision
maker (quarters ii and iv). This explains the relatively short life of eco-
nomic (and political) systems corresponding to quarters ii and iv. The
failure of centrally planned economies (quarter iii) is not because of
management conflicts but mostly due to rigidity, poor motivation and
low eﬃciency. It is interesting to underline the unstable character of the
economic models belonging to quarters ii and iv. Contradiction be-
tween the private ownership and centralised management (quarter ii)
will have serious eﬀects like economic and social unbalance, excessive
and immoral revenue sharing and, finally, the danger of significant un-
employment.
The opposition between state ownership and decentralised manage-
ment (as much as it is possible) leads to the property’s depreciation
through poor eﬃciency, as a result of the back interest, with a major
negative consequence, inflation (quarter iv).
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A diﬀerent situation, wherein the frames of private ownership and
free competition principles are broken and/or replaced by the centralised
command mechanisms, is that of the war economy (Germany, Italy, and
Romania, during World War ii). By laws and/or decrees, the economy’s
direction is accomplished by the state both at macro and, somehow, mi-
croeconomic levels. The state targets all the nation’s resources in order to
sustain the war eﬀorts. During the crisis this strategy can lead to results
that are superior to those from quarter i. But in normal times it hinders
initiative and dynamism, placing the economy behind the free markets.
It is also important to analyze the relation between company manage-
ment and ownership, by quarters.
• Quarter i. Interest aroused by private ownership and managerial
flexibility results in elastic and eﬃcient management. Under the ne-
cessity of free-market circumstances, governed by the principles of
the demand-supply balance and fair competition, the necessity of
a fast market information transfer appears. Extensive and intensive
use of information technology becomes a management tool.
• Quarter ii. There is private ownership motivation, but also cen-
tralised leadership that creates over-sized structures with slow reac-
tion time and a long information circuit. Quite rigid and disadvan-
tageous management is the result. This can be improved by using
information systems.
• Quarter iii. Management is imposed from outside the system.
The economy is of ‘command’ type but the company is deprived
of a basic managerial function: ‘decision-making’. That is ultra-
centralised, the communication channel is long, and information
is distorted and weakened through a bureaucratic chain with non-
existent feedback. In the few situations where it appears, it does not
contribute to the decision making. The lack of motivation increases
the system’s immobility.
• Quarter iv. Accepting that a company is allowed to make decision:
state ownership rejects that kind of motivation. The result is a for-
mal management. The information systems are used in an ineﬃ-
cient way, as well.
transition process
A successful transition process from communism to democracy and/or
market economymay be a tool for the economic development of a coun-
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try (Bitzenis 2007). The free market economy’s superiority (through mo-
tivation, adaptability and flexibility, and progress, and finally through
productivity and eﬃciency) is practically proved as well, confirmed by
the social and historical dynamics of economic systems. At least for eco-
nomic reasons, as the free-market economic system is more eﬃcient than
the centrally planned one, the transition to free-market economy is a
must.
Since the late 1990s, a rich literature has been developed, screen-
ing the various aspects of the transition. The prestigious journal Post-
Communist Economies (formerly Communist Economies and Economic
Transformation) has published, systematically, interesting articles on
various economic sectors, in diﬀerent transition countries such as:
Azerbaijan (Sabi 1997), Bulgaria (Mihaylova and Howe 1998), Croatia
(Cengic 1996), (East) Germany (Hölscher 1997), Hungary (Mihalyi 1996),
Poland (Kaminski 1998), Romania (Hunya 1998), Russia (Magomedov
1998), Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (Abazov 1997), Ukraine (Ishaq 1997;
Hirschhausen 1998). The critical issue of economic development is im-
portant for each individual country as well as for an entire region – it
could be either Central Asia or Eastern Europe (Brzeski and Colombatto
1999).
Over the last decade, comparative and multi-country studies were
conducted. Such a research completed in four countries from Central
and Eastern Europe (Romania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary)
has identified several areas of concern for the very dynamic sector of
small and medium-sized enterprises (smes), active internationally: lack
of appropriate financial instruments, diﬃcult access to market intelli-
gence, lack of professionalism within the business support infrastructure
(Lloyd-Reason et al. 2005). At the other extreme, there are numerous
examples of successful economic development, smes-based. Analysing
the Vietnamese economy, Harvie (2004) concludes that smes are job
creators, which contribute to sustainable economic development by ef-
ficient allocation of resources, expand the exports, achieve a more equal
distribution of incomes, and assist the rural and regional development.
Actually, the ‘Scarlat Model’ demonstrates that smes are the ideal ac-
tors to play on the stage of free-market economy: smes are totally private
and decentralized decision makers.
The Scarlat Model can be used to analyze the economic transition as
well. The transition process – from centrally planned economy to the
free-market economy –means simultaneous privatisation and decentral-
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figure 2 The transition model: From centrally planned economy
to the free-market economy
isation of the business management (figure 2). The adopted legal acts in
Romania (the Reorganisation of the State Owned Enterprises Act, the
Corporations Act, the Act of Land) target all the transition aspects men-
tioned before.
The fundamental problem is choosing and justifying the optimal strat-
egy, defined by:
• Duration and speed of transition (‘shock’ or ‘gradual’ transition).
• Transition path (trajectory).
• Privatisation techniques – as an essential component of the transi-
tion and economic reform.
• Transition management and strategy – as a result of all the above.
As far as duration/pace of transition is concerned – either ‘shock ther-
apy’ or ‘gradual transition’ – the champions of each of them might have
their arguments. However, ten years of transition oﬀer enough hard evi-
dences – as some countries have opted for ‘shock’ while most of them (as
Romania) have decided to follow the ‘gradual’ path (Giannaros 2000).
The proposed model allows for analysing all these aspects. For exam-
ple, regarding the transition path, the model’s analysis reveals three types
of trajectories, at least:
1. Direct transition (quarters iii −→ i); theoretically the most advan-
tageous but requires an outstanding managerial eﬀort.
2. Transition through quarter 2 (quarters iii −→ ii −→ i), which is
potentially high unemployment generative.
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figure 3 The model of the transition path of the Romanian Economy
3. Transition through quarter iv, threatened by inflation (quarters iii
−→ iv −→ i).
It is important to mention that these three types are just basic tra-
jectories. Bitzenis (2007) has introduced nine general reform paths of
transition.
If the economic criterion (inflation avoidance) is overwhelming, vari-
ant (2) will be chosen meaning prioritising the privatisation. If the social
criterion (lowest possible unemployment) prevails, (3) will be followed
and companies will become fully autonomous.
From the theoretical, managerial standpoint, transition should be as
short and straight as possible. Prolonging the transition through unsta-
ble statuses (quarters ii and iv) induces stresses and leads to a drop in
economic eﬃciency, or else a decrease in the speed of the economic re-
form process.
As mentioned before, the split between private/state or centralized/de-
centralized is pretty rigid. The model can be improved, considering both
ownership and decentralisation as having continuous variation: owner-
ship percentage and degree of decentralisation. The proposed model –
slightly modified (figure 3) – allows for investigating the real path fol-
lowed by Romania on its way to a free-market economy.
The overall survey on the Romanian economy and business environ-
ment allows us to conclude that most of the legal framework is in place
and the business is very active. According to a detailed survey conducted
and published back in 2004: ‘Romania does not request a transition pe-
riod or impairment of law and states that it will be possible to fully en-
force the acquis after the accession’ (Fuerea et al. 2004, 29).
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figure 4 The role of government: The legal environment development
and protection
role of the government
As we have seen, the match between ownership and management in
quarter i is only the background for an eﬃcient economic system. For
countries in transition – as Romania – the government is less and less
an economic actor but a crucial rule maker. After the transition manage-
ment role, the government must play another essential role: the guard
and the guarantor of the free-market economic system. In order to main-
tain the viability of the free-market economy system, its borders should
be safely defended by (figure 4):
• ‘anti-trust’ regulations (antimonopoly) in order to discourage the
movement back to quarter ii,
• laws for property protection and limitation of nationalisation pro-
cesses that should not allow access towards quarter iv,
as well as measures of stability within the system:
• fair competition legislation, and
• laws for consumers’ protection.
To all these, the legal framework for environment protection is a sine-
qua-non condition for sustainable development.
During its eu accession process, Romania had to pay attention to all
these aspects as follows (Fuerea et al. 2004):
• Fair competition: ‘In this field [. . .] legislation is harmonized with
similar European legislation. There is a high proportion of com-
patibility with eu legislation regarding the regulation of corporate
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agreements, dominant position abuse and the control of economic
concentrations.’
• Consumer protection: ‘In conclusion, the degree of concordance be-
tween the Romanian legislation and acquis [. . .] is estimated to be
relatively high since all measures taken by Romania are fully com-
patible.’
• Environment protection: in this area, Romania still has ‘to pro-
mote a normative measure to support the local budgets in creat-
ing/improving the environment infrastructure.’
Justification of those measures lies in the fundamental principles of
the free-market economy: open competition, balance between the de-
mand and supply, and company autonomy.
As far as the private sector is concerned, the government plays an im-
portant role, too. The ‘privatization’ process is only one of the ways to
create a significant private sector in the economy:
• privatisation of the former state-owned enterprises,
• creation of new private firms – small business start-ups, mostly
(which started right after December 1989),
• restitution of the properties confiscated by the communist regime
between 1945 and 1985.
This is why the ‘creation of the private sector’ syntagm – which is
strongly recommended to be used – reflects the real-life processes bet-
ter than the word ‘privatization’.
The Romanian government took action in all the above directions.
Only the pace was diﬀerent. As an example, the major steps for prop-
erty restitutions are chronologically displayed in table 1. Similar investi-
gations can be performed for other means to create the private sector.
The Romanian Statistics Authority periodically provides data in this re-
spect.
It has to be emphasized that the government has to be the referee of
the economy game, not a player. But its role and implication are some-
times rather diﬃcult to assess, mainly in transition economies. For ex-
ample, in Czech Republic, the influence of the government in the econ-
omy was higher than what the government oﬃcially conceded during the
1990s (Kreuzbergova 2006). So-called ‘banking socialism’ has meant the
indirect control of the recently privatized companies by the government-
controlled banks.
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table 1 Property restitution acts in Romania
Act number/year Restitution object
18/1991 Land for agriculture (less than 10 ha)
82/1992 Urban pieces of land
1/2000 Forests, land larger than 10 ha
10/2001 Buildings (restrictive)
247/2005 Most of the properties
Too much involvement of the government in the economy means less
economic freedom. The Heritage Foundation and Dow Jones & Com-
pany, Inc. is annually publishing – since 1995 – the world ranking of eco-
nomic freedom, according to the ‘index of economic freedom’, which is
based on some tens of independent variables, grouped in 10 broad factors
of economic freedom, strongly influenced by the government policy.
The economic freedom ‘encompasses all liberties and rights of pro-
duction, distribution, or consumption of goods and services. The highest
form of economic freedom provides an absolute right of property owner-
ship, fully realized freedoms of movement for labour, capital, and goods,
and an absolute absence of coercion or constraint of economic liberty
beyond the extent necessary for citizens to protect and maintain liberty
itself. In other words, individuals are free to work, produce, consume,
and invest in any way they please, and that freedom is both protected by
the state and unconstrained by the state’ (Beach and Kane 2007, 38). It
should be noted that the absence of government coercion or constraint
must also include a sense of liberty as distinct from anarchy.
The 2007 Index of Economic Freedom ranks Romania on 67th place
(compared to 92nd place in 2006) in a global list of 161 countries (Kane,
Holmes, and O’Grady 2007). The position corresponds to the consid-
erably large group of ‘moderately free-countries’ – where the majority
of former communist countries are ranked. The lower the position, the
greater the level of government interference in the economy, and the less
economic freedom the respective country enjoys.
end of transition
The question of ‘when the transition process ends’ (Scarlat 1999) is dou-
bly important: not only for the sake of theory, but for practical reasons as
well (just think about the status of ‘functional market economy’ accord-
ing to which the candidate countries for eu accession were assessed).
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On the other hand, Kumar (2006) finds that there is a strong correla-
tion between world trade and a well-established market economy such as
in the usa, Japan and countries in eu, while there is a small correlation
between the world trade and a transitional economy such as Russia. In
other words, the ‘functional market economies’ have better established
import and export transactions and, consequently, economic welfare.
The Scarlat model is able to oﬀer a reliable answer to the sensitive
question of ‘when the transition process ends’. In theory, by the time
when the private ownership is prevailing and the business management
is dominantly decentralized, then the free-market economy system is in
place (figure 2). In practice, during the transition process, it is necessary
tomeasure both the private ownership percentage and degree of business
management decentralisation (figure 3).Whenmore than 50% in both of
them (or a diﬀerent but higher than 50% privatisation and/or decentral-
isation target) is reached, then the process of economic transition towards
the free-market economy is considered over.
While the percentage of private ownership is relatively easy to calcu-
late, based on regular statistics (see, for example, figure 5, which depicts
the Romanian case for its privatization target), the degree of business
management decentralisation is rather diﬃcult to assess.
In any case, a coherent set of criteria for assessing the degree of de-
centralisation has to be developed. Such a set of criteria should include
vital decisions at the company level – such as decisions on: companymis-
sion and strategy, budget, company suppliers and clients, pricing policy,
personnel policy (number, structure, salaries, hiring and firing), invest-
ments, acquisitions and mergers, insolvency and bankruptcy. Further re-
search on this issue is to be completed and eventually published.
There are also other standpoints, methods and/or information sources
that could be used to assess, conventionally, the point in time when the
economic transition gets – conventionally – to its end. The question is,
somehow, rhetorical – because . . . the transition never ends: the eco-
nomic system – even after reaching the ‘free-market economy’ quad-
rant – is not rigid, it is continuously evolving (within the same quadrant,
hopefully). Several approaches mostly used to diagnose and identify that
moment when the economic transition is conventionally over are men-
tioned below.
• The political approach (altough it also considers a complex of ele-
ments): the transition is over when the eu sentences it – in Country
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figure 5 Privatisation dynamics in Romania, 1992–2004
Report – and considers the economic system as a ‘functional mar-
ket economy’. For Romania, this happened by the end of 2003: ‘Ro-
mania can be considered as a functional market economy once the
good progress made has continued decisively’ (European Commis-
sion 2003, 7).
• The economic approach: the economic transition is over when the
country’s yearly gdp reaches the pre-transition maximum level.
The Romanian economy has reached this value in the years 2002–
2003, according to wb and un estimates, respectively, at mar-
ket prices, current prices, in usd (see United Nations Common
Database at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cdb). It is significant that
countries, which were forced to follow reform paths in belligerent
and/or violent forms, have reported limited economic growth and
‘not only lag behind the other transition countries in the region, but
also, as of today, have not even reached the levels they had attained
in 1989’ (Bitzenis 2007).
• The management approach: the economic transition is completed
at that point in time when the strategic objectives are reached (in
terms of gdp, private sector dimension, etc). For example: the pri-
vatisation target was achieved by 2003 (figure 5).
• The econo-statistics approach: based on time-frequency series anal-
ysis, which will be further discussed.
As all the above may present cross – influences, a correlated approach
is recommended. In the case of Romania, the diﬀerent approaches con-
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figure 6 Time evolution of the rol/usd exchange rate, at logarithm scale (based on
the data published on the National Bank of Romania web site, www.bnr.ro)
verge to indicate that economic transition reached its end by 2002–2003.
This conclusion will be supported by the conclusions of the next section.
Analysis Tools for the Transition Path
The transition process was not linear. Besides its trajectory and duration,
it is interesting to assess when the transition ends and identify if other
elements have occurred on the transition path. There are also more so-
phisticated tools to analyze the transition path, behavioural patterns and
specific features. For example, from the point of view of the determinis-
tic chaos (i. e. short-run predictability), the analysis of time series might
lead to interesting results. A time series might be anything between ran-
domness and determinism; in turn, the determinism might be chaotic
(i. e. sensitive to initial conditions) or classic (non sensitive).
The researchmethodology is based on the analysis of the time series of
macroeconomic indicators, by statistical methods; the macroeconomic
indicator chosen: the us dollar (usd) exchange rate. The figures were
collected based on the daily values reported by the Romanian central
bank (Banca Nationala a Romaniei) over a period of sixteen years of Ro-
manian recent history: 1990–2005.
This period includes the interval used previously for presenting the
privatisation process: 1992–2004 (figure 5). A comprehensive research
was conducted on the evolution of the Romanian currency exchange rate
(rol) with respect to the us dollar (usd). Figure 6 depicts the overall
evolution. The logarithm scale was used because of large variations of
the indicator (up to 104).
The analysis was performed taking into consideration three criteria:
Volume 5 · Number 4 · Winter 2007
322 Cezar Scarlat and Eugen I. Scarlat
• System complexity (this is not necessarily the whole economy, but
part of it, as monetary system).
• Sensitivity to initial conditions (as a pointer of the predictability).
• Persistence of the evolutionary trend (indicating the similitude
with the random-walk behaviour, i. e. the lack of deterministic pre-
dictability in favour of probabilistic predictability).
In the nonlinear dynamics theory, the corresponding quantities for
the above mentioned criteria are the correlation dimension, the largest
Lyapunov exponent (Bask 1996) and the Hurst coeﬃcient (Tsonnis et al.
2001).
The degree of complexity of the underlying system is quantitatively
given by the correlation dimension referring to the minimum number
of variables that is needed to replicate the dynamic system. The last one
is the same with the dimension of the (strange) attractor characterizing
whichever one of the topological-equivalent systems (Takens 1981). It is
worth noting that the number of variables that replicates the system is
fractional, according to the theory of the strange attractors (Kantz and
Schreiber 1997).
The sensitivity to initial conditions could explain the spreading diver-
sity of the present – day economic systems, even if they were starting
from quite similar prerequisites. This is a basic feature of the chaotic sys-
tems. Hence, one way of revealing the existence of deterministic chaos in
a time series is to measure the degree of divergence of nearby orbits in
the phase-space. Such divergence δ(t) can be measured by the Lyapunov
exponents λ, and the presence of at least one positive exponent is taken
as indicating to what extent the evolution is predictable over a specific
time range (Rosenstein 1993):
δ(t)  δ(0) · eλt . (1)
As far as concerns the persistence of the evolutionary trend, the Hurst
exponent is an additional pointer for making the distinction between
randomness and causality; besides, its value of 0.5 separates the per-
sistent and anti-persistent evolutionary trends (Stanley and Mantegna
2004). It is defined by the time evolution of the root-mean-square fluc-
tuation of the averaged displacement over all possible positions t0 (the
bars indicate the average):
{
[x(t0 + t) − x(t)]2 −
[
x(t0 + t) − x(t)
]2} 12 ∼ tH (2)
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The values of the Hurst exponent (H) range between 0 and 1. A value
of 0.5 indicates a true random walk (a Brownian time series). In a ran-
dom walk there is no correlation between any element and a future ele-
ment. AHurst exponent value 0.5<H < 1 indicates ‘persistent behaviour’
(e. g. a positive autocorrelation). If there is an increase from time step i −
1 to i, there will probably be an increase from i to i + 1. The same is true
for decreases: a decrease tends to follow a decrease. A Hurst exponent
value 0 < H < 0.5 indicates a time series with ‘anti-persistent behaviour’
(or negative autocorrelation): an increase tends to be followed by a de-
crease, or conversely, a decrease will be followed by an increase. This be-
haviour is sometimes called ‘mean reversion’.
Some results of the research conducted in Romania are further pre-
sented. The analysis of the transition path – using all the above criteria –
has revealed three intervals, as follows (figure 7):
i. 1990–1997
ii. 1998–2001
iii. 2002–2005.
Obviously, the three intervals are splits of the diagram depicted in fig-
ure 6.
Interval i (1990–1997) is characterized by simple underlying dynam-
ics and low fractal dimension, weak sensitivity to initial conditions, and
a very aggressive, positive long-run trend. After the social and political
events that provoked the fall of the totalitarian regime, the inertia of
the total deterministic evolution of the economy of command that had
been legally operated until the end of 1989 prolonged the eﬀect for sev-
eral more years, when the economy diminished to work as a ‘national
holding’, and both the lack of an adequate institutional feed-back and
the social pressure led to political decisions of maintaining the exchange
rate at artificial constant values. Thus, the accumulation of the demand
pressure upon the slow-developing supply led to an increased import of
goods; the insuﬃcient feed-forward of a weak monetary system could
not balance the long response time of production, and explosive cor-
rections occurred in the form of stepped jumps of the exchange rate
rol/usd (see figure 7a). The exchange rate is deterministic and ‘very’
predictable from the long-run perspective (short-run understood), with
a lot of angular points. The main features of this time interval are sum-
marized in table 2.
Interval ii (1998–2001), as figure 7b shows, is characterized by in-
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creased correlation dimension, i. e. more complex dynamics, and clear
positive values for the largest Lyapunov exponent. All the usual hypothe-
ses for chaotic dynamics are fulfilled, and this is the domain with sig-
nificant functional changes toward the open market economy. The pos-
itive long-run trend continues, but the averaged relative variation per
year of the exchange rate is a hundred times lower (72.27% compared
to 7264.29% for interval 1). The exchange rate remains predictable both
from the short- and long-run perspective (table 2), exhibiting a much
smoother curve.
The interval iii (2002–2005) – see figure 7c – is closer to the random
walk behaviour, as pointed out by the anti-persistence of the short run
trend. It might be a chaotic deterministic, with a higher volatility than
the previous one, or stochastic, or mixed; in order to decide in this mat-
ter, further analysis is necessary. To simplify, we only mention here that
the evolution remains of causal type. For the purpose of this paper, it
is important that there are arguments to state that the transition seems
to come to its end by the end of 2001 due to at least two reasons: the
first is the disappearance of the long-run trend and, consequently, the
beginning of the steady state regime, and the second is the complexity of
the structure revealed by the fractal dimension of interval iii. As stated
in the literature (Schwartz and Yousefi 2003), a free market economy in a
steady state regime contains a strange attractor with a correlation dimen-
sion around 4.5, and that is the case for Romania (table 2). The exchange
rate predictability is weak, with small deviations from the nearly hori-
zontal baseline (excepting a significant fall in March 2005 – see figure 7c).
This is the consequence of the new settled macroeconomic equilibriums,
very sensitive to the environmental stimuli, but also with high capacity
to recover the functional ‘working points’.
Significantly low predictability is consistent with the long run be-
haviour, which in fact has no trend, and the curve approaches a random
walk appearance (figure 7c). In a steady-state-running economy, as men-
tioned by other authors, a positive real part of the largest Lyapunov coef-
ficient seems to be normal. Moreover, the greater the correlation dimen-
sion, the more complex the economic system (and the monetary policy
of the Central Bank).
The Romanian transition trajectory seems to be of the type iii −→ iv
−→ i. A smaller Lyapunov exponent is consistent with a higher degree
of short run predictability in an economic system; for the first period,
the exchange rate is predictable from the long run perspective (posi-
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figure 7 The dynamics of the three intervals of the transition period (1990–2005) –
the evolution of the usd exchange rate against Romanian rol
tive trend). The smaller Lyapunov exponent characterizing the period
of structural changes indicates smaller sensitivity to the initial condition
together with a non-randoml evolution toward a more complex system
characterizing the steady-state-regime.
Overall, it is important to note that time series analysis indicates the
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table 2 The three time intervals and their characteristics (based on the evolution
of usd exchange rate against Romanian rol)
Characteristics Interval i Interval ii Interval iii
Time range 1 January 1990–
31 December 1997
1 January 1998–
31 December 2001
1 January 2002–
31 October 2005
Complexity (system
dimension)
1.74 3.09 4.45
System sensitivity to
initial conditions
Weak Strong Strong
Trend Persistent Persistent Anti-persistent
Type of predictability Long-run,
deterministic
Long-run, chaotic
deterministic
Short-run, chaotic
deterministic
end of 2001 as the end of the transition process – which confirms the
previous conclusion (end of transition process in Romania: 2002–2003).
Open Closing: EU Accession Process –
A Diﬀerent Type of Transition
As the eu accession is a transition process itself, Romania – like other
Eastern European countries – has been ‘in transition process’ twice.
Fortunately, the transition to the ‘functional’ free-market economy is
naturally connected to the eu accession process (Scarlat and Richevaux
2006). Several impact studies were conducted in Romania under pais
(Pre-Accession Impact Studies): pais i (2001–2002), pais ii (2003–
2004), pais iii (2005–2006). Overall, the pais studies were intended
to provide recommendations to the Romanian Government to support
negotiations with the European Commission.
Under pais i (Scarlat, Popescu, and Warner 2002) primary and sec-
ondary research (desk research and formal face-to-face interviews) was
conducted. The main objective of the study was to provide an overview
of the institutional requirements for implementing the acquis commu-
nautaire in Romania and to provide a set of recommendations.
Most of the above issues and recommendations were presented to the
ria International Conference in Sofia (Scarlat 2003b). As these recom-
mendations were acknowledged by the Conference participants coming
from ex-communist countries, it means that this set of recommendations
are applicable not only to Romania but to most of the ex-communist, eu
accession countries.
The studies conducted under pais ii (Fuerea et al. 2004) confirmed
that Romania – like other eu candidate countries in economic transition
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– is aiming at a ‘mobile target’: harmonization of the Romanian legisla-
tion with the acquis communautaire is based on two processes (transpo-
sition of the Community legislation into the Romanian legislation and
rendering compatible the national normative measures which transpose
the acquis with the provisions of the Community legislation). The re-
search revealed that the concordance degree of the Romanian legislation
with the eu legislation (in force in 2002) was approximately 75%. The
problem is that the acquis covers more than 90,000 pages (out of which
about 20,000 are continuously being amended!)
The eu accession process was a diﬀerent type of transition – not only
planned but rigorously regulated and monitored. Following the eu acces-
sion, the eu integration process is a diﬀerent topic, both quantitatively and
qualitatively diﬀerent.
Conclusions
• The general economy model that was presented (‘Scarlat Model’)
is a useful analysis framework to discuss the transition features –
mainly its path but also transition duration, delays, priorities (pri-
vatisation vs. decentralisation) – ultimately the transition strategy.
• The sophisticated research tools applied for transition path analysis,
based on the theory of deterministic chaos, lead to revealing results:
in the case of Romania, three neatly distinct intervals were identified
and described. According to its transition policy and development
strategy, the Romanian transition trajectory seems to be of the type
iii (centrally planned economy) −→ iv (‘social market’ economy)
−→ i (free-market economy).
• Despite several improvements still expected to be made, the basic
structural changes towards a functional market economy in Roma-
nia were implemented up to the end of 2001. It is important to note
that time series analysis indicates the end of 2001 as the end of the
transition process – which confirms the previous conclusion (end
of transition process in Romania: 2002–2003).
• This model was applied in the case of Romania but it is fully appli-
cable to all Eastern European countries and not only Romania. In
this case, interesting comparative analyses might be performed.
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